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INTRODUCTION
Like many of our friends and allies, Australia is currently engaged in a major reassessment of its strategic policy. 
Those in and around the policymaking process are trying to define the nation’s core values and interests, to identify 
the most likely threats to those values and interests, and to frame a strategy that will best protect and promote our 
national security. This is happening at a time when many defence budgets are severely constrained. While the public 
hopes for a ‘peace dividend’ following a period of substantial military activity, governments are obliged to reassert 
control of their budgets and reinvigorate their national economies. A period of postwar economic austerity would 
seem to be the worst time to prepare a long-term national security strategy.
In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, American diplomatic historian Melvyn Leffler turned this familiar dilemma on 
its head (Leffler 2013). Periods of postwar austerity and drastic cuts in military spending, according to him, have 
been good for American strategy, ‘forcing Washington to think strategically, something it rarely does when times 
are flush’. Austerity, he said, brings out ‘the importance of having a coherent strategic concept, a clear assessment 
of threats, a precise delineation of interests and goals, and a calibrated sense of priorities’. It also forces leaders 
to coordinate their military and diplomatic assets, and to strike an appropriate balance between resources and 
commitments. Looking at the past hundred years of American strategy, Leffler argued that problems and errors 
arose less from tight budgets than from clinging too long to outdated strategic ideas and capabilities, under the 
influence of bureaucratic and domestic politics.
This paper takes a similar approach to Australian strategic thinking. The strategic calculations of a regional middle 
power are in some respects similar to those of a global superpower, but in others decidedly different from them. 
The fiscal circumstances are different, and not just because the Australian defence budget is a mere fraction of 
the American. In recent years, Australian governments of both political persuasions have set a goal of 2% of GDP 
for defence, but it remains to be seen whether that can be achieved. But questions about the allocation of roles 
and resources between the military, diplomatic, intelligence and other agencies have some common themes. As 
a lively debate in the ASPI blog, The Strategist, recently demonstrated, there’s much discussion about the nature 
and meaning of strategy, and where strategic planning’s to be found in the governmental structure. Does the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ‘do strategy’, or is strategy the exclusive territory of the Department 
of Defence? Moreover, some of Australia’s problems may have come not only from clinging too long to outdated 
ideas, but also from discarding some that are still relevant—perhaps we’ve thrown out some strategic babies with 
the bathwater.
Chapter 1 of this paper places our current position in the history of the major phases of Australian strategic policy 
since Federation. It then examines one of those phases—the years from about 1950 to 1975, when Australia’s 
strategic concept (to use Leffler’s term) was often summarised as ‘forward defence’. It outlines the main elements—
what Hillary Clinton recently called the ‘organising principles’1—of that strategy. The next three chapters assess the 
way those principles were implemented, with particular attention to the way the Australian Government handled 
commitments to three conflicts in Southeast Asia. Chapter 2 comments on Australian policymaking during the 
Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960, Chapter 3 addresses policies during the Indonesian Confrontation from 1963 
to 1966, and Chapter 4 comments on the Australian commitment to the Vietnam War, in which our service personnel 
were involved from 1962 to 1972. Finally, Chapter 5 draws some lessons from the forward defence era that remain 
applicable to our current challenges.
CHAPTER 1
Forward defence
In Australian strategic thinking, the present time can best be seen as the start of the fifth major cycle since 
Federation. Each cycle started after a major war or period of military activity, as the country’s leaders reassessed 
our place in the world, and especially our potential military commitments. The first came after the South African War 
(or Boer War) of 1899–1902, which overlapped Federation; the second followed the First World War of 1914–18; the 
third began in the late 1940s, after the Second World War; the fourth followed the end of the Vietnam War in 1975; 
the current cycle follows an extended period of active operational engagement, from the East Timor crisis of 1999 to 
the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2013.
In each case, while the public looked for a peace dividend that would shift public expenditure away from military 
demands towards the economic and welfare requirements of peacetime, Australian governments sought to define 
something like what the British call a grand strategy and the Americans a national strategy: a concept of the nation’s 
place in the world, which provides a framework for its external engagement, in peace and war, for the foreseeable 
future. Military strategy is an important part, but only a part, of a grand strategy, which ideally should give a 
coherent summary of the way a nation intends to develop and deploy all its hard and soft power assets—including 
its diplomatic, trade, aid, intelligence, cultural and other resources, as well as its armed forces.
Alliances versus going it alone
For any nation-state, this involves assessing threats and opportunities, balancing resources and commitments, 
and defining roles for the armed services and various civilian agencies. For Australia, it also involves balancing two 
fundamental approaches that have long competed for supremacy in shaping Australia’s strategic outlook. The first 
starts from the premise that Australia has a small population and limited resources, but has to defend an entire 
continent and interests that extend far afield, in a volatile, potentially hostile, part of the world. Consequently, 
Australian security demands that we maintain the closest possible relationship with at least one major ally, with 
which we share many common interests and values, even a sense of identity, and which possesses the military 
power to defend not only our shared interests but also the sort of international order in which Australia and 
like-minded nations can flourish. For many years, that ally was Britain; for the past half-century or more, it’s 
been the US. Historically, we’ve been willing to pay our dues, in blood and treasure, to ensure the health of our 
relationship with our great-power allies. As Allan Gyngell (2014:382) recently put it, ‘the insurance premium is the 
most powerful metaphor in Australian international policy.’
In constant contest with this idea is the rival view that Australia should place independence ahead of alliance as our 
highest ideal in international affairs. Advocates of this view assert that excessive dependence on allies leads us into 
‘other people’s wars’; that we can’t rely on distant allies in the northern hemisphere, who’ll always place their own 
national interests ahead of those of small countries down here, no matter how promptly we’ve paid our insurance 
premiums; and that we should instead concentrate on making as many friends, and as few enemies, as possible 
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in our own region. The latest round in this debate has been sparked by Malcolm Fraser’s book, Dangerous allies 
(Fraser 2014), but the argument is far from new. It can be traced back at least as far as to the 1850s, when the colonial 
authorities established Fort Denison in Sydney Harbour and other coastal defences at the time of the Crimean War.
A look at Australia’s history suggests that there’ll always be advocates for each of those views. For their part, most 
governments will assert that their policies are designed to ensure that there’s no conflict. They like to assure the 
public that, under their management, Australia’s alliances strengthen our regional relationships, and vice versa. 
John Howard said that we didn’t have to choose between our history and our geography; Kevin Rudd said that we 
could walk and chew gum at the same time. To quote Allan Gyngell again, Australians now expect their governments 
to manage the alliance with the US, to sustain positive relationships with major Asian countries, and to preserve 
Australia’s place in a rules-based international order (2014:382).
To achieve this resolution, Australian governments have usually taken a number of steps. One is to seek, from our 
principal ally or group of allies, not only an assurance of support in our hour of need, but also access to the ‘top 
table’ of decision-making, so that our leaders have a voice in where, when and how our forces are used. Every 
significant Australian prime minister from Alfred Deakin to John Howard pursued that goal. They also sought to 
assure the public that Australian strategy would give priority to threats in our immediate region. They’d fight far 
from home only if that were clearly in our national interests. Such commitments usually meant fighting in areas 
around the Mediterranean and the Middle East, which were clearly important in the global balance of power as well 
as to Australia’s communications with Britain and Europe. Australian forces were seldom committed to more distant 
regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa or Latin America.
The Cold War produces the strategy
Let’s now turn to the third of the strategic cycles identified above. In the early 1950s, as the world adjusted to the 
end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, the Australian Government adopted a strategic 
concept often summarised as ‘forward defence’. A generation later, after the fall of Saigon in 1975, that concept 
was seen as deeply flawed. In the post-1975 reaction against anything associated with the humiliation in Vietnam, 
forward defence was discredited, together with the domino theory, the American alliance, the Anzac tradition, and 
much else. Australia’s national security policy, it was alleged, had been reduced to the crudely simplistic idea that 
‘we must fight them up there before we have to fight them down here’. Forward defence allegedly portrayed the 
enemy in racist as well as ideological terms—a combination of the Red Peril and the Yellow Peril. Critics alleged 
that it committed Australia to fight in a profoundly unwise, even immoral, war alongside the US as an expression of 
obsequious subservience to our great-power ally. To this day, Australian political and military leaders are careful to 
dissociate themselves from forward defence, especially when expressing support for the American alliance.
A more careful analysis of Australia’s defence and foreign policies between 1950 and 1975 indicates that there’s a 
large element of caricature in that portrayal (although some of its supporters didn’t help during the 1966 election 
campaign, when posters portrayed threatening arrows emerging from China and pointing at Australia, evoking 
memories of Japan’s southward thrust in 1942). When carefully implemented, forward defence was an appropriate 
strategic concept for the times. It met many of the criteria for a well-balanced national strategy—or even a modest 
grand strategy, however oxymoronic that sounds.
When carefully implemented, forward defence was an appropriate 
strategic concept for the times. 
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This assessment is based on a study of what the Australian Government of the day said and did—and what it 
sometimes did not say or do—during the third quarter of the 20th century.2 From that analysis, the following emerge 
as the major elements of forward defence.
Only in our region
First, and most importantly, Australia would commit military forces only in our immediate region, which (after the 
Korean War) meant Southeast Asia. Notwithstanding the reverence accorded to Gallipoli, and the fresh memories 
of Tobruk and Alamein, the Menzies government explicitly ruled out a return to the Middle East – Mediterranean 
theatre. This was no light decision. The political and military leaders of our then major ally, Britain, indicated that 
if there were a Third World War against the Soviet Union—a well-founded fear, at least until Stalin’s death in 1953—
they’d welcome an Australian return to the strategically vital areas around the Suez Canal and the Arabian oilfields. 
Australia made gestures in that direction, while the government decided where its principal interests were located. 
For a time, two RAAF squadrons were based in Malta and took part in NATO exercises. But from 1953, Australia 
insisted that its military commitments would only be in what Menzies had much earlier called the ‘near north’.
Only with great and powerful friends
Second, Australian forces would only be committed alongside the forces of the US, Britain or, preferably, both. 
Like most Australians who had experienced the Second World War, Menzies had an acute sense of vulnerability to 
threats from the north, and a firm belief that only the might of the Americans, and to a lesser extent their British and 
European allies, had saved Australia from an ignominious fate. Anything approaching an independent or self-reliant 
stance in defence was, in the minds of Menzies and his colleagues, simply beyond Australia’s resources.
Menzies famously spoke of Australia’s need for, and gratitude to, ‘great and powerful friends’. Note the plural 
‘friends’. It was not, as often asserted, a simple matter of turning away from Britain towards the US. Britain still had 
substantial interests and responsibilities in Southeast Asia, and extensive forces to protect them. Menzies didn’t 
want Australia, and other Western countries, to have to rely solely on the US for their security. Helping Britain 
to restore its economic and military strength, and thereby justify its place at the top table of world powers, was 
therefore in Australia’s own interests. This would be done even at the risk of offending American sensitivities. Making 
Australian territory, at Maralinga and elsewhere, available for British nuclear tests in the 1950s was one step towards 
the restoration of Britain’s global power and prestige—qualities that Menzies saw as protecting Australia’s interests 
both in the region and in the global order.
Like many Australians of his time, Menzies assumed that Australia’s security was based in large measure on 
European dominance of most of Southeast Asia. The rapid post-1945 decolonisation of the European empires in 
Asia and Africa, especially in Southeast Asia, discomfited him. But the departure of the Dutch from the Netherlands 
East Indies (apart from West New Guinea) in 1949 and of the French from Indochina in 1954 only made Menzies all 
the more determined to do whatever he could to retain British and American power in the region. Menzies and his 
colleagues deployed Australia’s assets—military, diplomatic, geographic, even Menzies’ own prestige and oratorical 
skill—towards the goal of keeping both Britain and the US committed to the security of the Southeast Asian region, 
a part of the world that ranked far higher in Australia’s strategic priorities than in those of either of the northern 
hemisphere powers.
Like many Australians of his time, Menzies assumed that Australia’s 
security was based in large measure on European dominance of most 
of Southeast Asia. 
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Preferably in multilateral coalitions
Third, while the forward defence strategy was always focused principally on cooperation with the US and Britain, 
the Australian Government had a strong preference for fighting in a large coalition that included other diplomatically 
respectable partners. In this respect, as in many others, the Korean War created the template that Australia sought 
to follow in its Southeast Asian commitments. In Korea, Australia fought as part of a 16-nation coalition. The US 
provided the military leadership and a major part of the combat forces and logistic support, but other nations made 
substantial commitments. Australia contributed forces from all three armed services, and Australian and British 
infantry battalions were combined in a Commonwealth brigade. This was later replaced by another Commonwealth 
brigade, combining British, Australian, New Zealand and Indian units. During the war, the Commonwealth brigade 
was linked with British and Canadian brigades to form a Commonwealth division.
Australians were always more comfortable fighting alongside their longstanding Commonwealth allies, especially 
the British and New Zealanders. Their tactics, doctrines, equipment and military jargon were more familiar and 
congenial than those of the Americans. And the Commonwealth structure gave the Australians greater opportunity 
for command experience than would have been possible when linked solely with American forces. After the 
government committed a second battalion to Korea, Australian brigadiers commanded the Commonwealth 
brigade, in which the Australians had the preponderance of forces.
Fighting as part of a broad coalition supported the argument that Australia was fighting for democratic values 
against communist aggression, rather than lending support to American imperialism. While the Australian 
Government devoted considerable effort to ensure that its policies were coordinated with the US, Britain and New 
Zealand, it was sensitive to the American assertion that they must not give the impression that a ‘white man’s club’ 
was trying to dictate the future of an Asian region. Consequently, Australia wanted to have its military commitments 
endorsed by a large, multiracial international organisation. The Korean War had the best possible imprimatur, being 
fought under the aegis of the United Nations. Where UN endorsement wasn’t possible, the Australians looked to the 
Commonwealth or an organisation such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), of which more below.
Another element in the Australian preference for a multilateral, coalition environment was often in the minds of 
Australian policymakers, although seldom made public. It might be called ‘the MacArthur factor’, as it was based 
largely on the Australian experience of operating under the overall command of General Douglas MacArthur, 
first during the Pacific campaigns of the Second World War and more especially in Korea. The Australians 
feared that reliance on the enormous military strength of the US carried with it the risk of an American military 
commander who would take unnecessary risks, possibly even precipitating a nuclear conflict with China. The 
Menzies government had, albeit discreetly, shared the very public concern of the British Government over General 
MacArthur’s speculation about the use of nuclear weapons in Korea and his ‘push to the Yalu’, which had prompted 
Chinese intervention in the war. In Australian policymaking circles, many hoped that a large international coalition, 
preferably including Britain, would help to ensure that American military might was deployed effectively but 
with restraint.
For all these reasons, the Australian Government welcomed the creation of SEATO following the Geneva Conference 
of 1954, which divided Vietnam into a communist north and a non-communist south. SEATO’s members were the 
US, the UK, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines. It seemed to meet many of Australia’s 
criteria for a desirable framework within which to operate in Southeast Asia. On the face of it, SEATO linked distant 
powers with local nations; it committed the military might of the US, Britain and France to the defence of the weak, 
non-communist nations of postcolonial Southeast Asia; it placed American military strength and leadership within a 
multilateral coalition environment, with the prospect of benefiting from British experience and the local knowledge 
of the Thais and Filipinos; it indicated that the Thais had replaced their traditional inclination to bend with the 
prevailing wind with a determination to offer strong resistance to communist expansion; it committed the member 
nations to link their military planning for the region; and it offered the prospect of securing one of Australia’s 
longstanding goals—access to American military and political plans in their formative stages. It was significant, for 
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example, that John Wilton’s last position before his long-anticipated appointment as the Australian Army’s chief was 
as head of the SEATO Military Planning Office in Bangkok (see Horner 2005).
For some years, the Australian Government gave greater prominence to SEATO than it did to ANZUS. For example, 
it gave considerable publicity to meetings of SEATO’s political and military bodies in the late 1950s, when Canberra 
was becoming increasingly concerned about the direction of American policy over Australia’s major concern in 
the region—Indonesia’s claim to West New Guinea. In the early 1960s, Australia continued to cling to SEATO as the 
supposed framework for Western involvement in Indochina, even as the organisation’s profound flaws became 
increasingly obvious. The French clearly had no desire to return to Indochina after the humiliation of Dien Bien 
Phu, and were now proposing the ‘neutralisation’ of Southeast Asia. The British had backed away from their earlier 
support of the domino theory, and no longer regarded the conflict in Vietnam as directly affecting the security of 
their responsibilities on the Malayan peninsula and the island of Borneo. SEATO had thus become little more than an 
American–Thai–Australian alliance, and the Americans retained their traditional reluctance to share their plans with 
their allies. Nevertheless, the appeal of a broad multinational coalition was such that the Australian Government, in 
the critical period of late 1964 and early 1965, continued to argue that its commitment to Vietnam was consistent 
with, and ‘flowed from’, its SEATO obligations, when that was an increasingly transparent veneer.
Talk a good war, but limit the commitment
Fourth, the determination of the Menzies government to do all it could to retain British and American power in 
the region didn’t mean that military contributions were easily volunteered. More commonly, they were used as 
bargaining chips—conceded reluctantly, in response to considerable pressure, on the understanding that their 
military significance was less important than their diplomatic value. While the critics of Australian foreign policy 
for the past hundred years have alleged that Australia has been only too willing to commit forces to ‘other people’s 
wars’, the view from London and Washington, since 1945, has often been that Australians ‘talk a good war’: the 
strength of the political and diplomatic support for our allies hasn’t always been matched by the number of boots 
on the ground.
The nature of Australia’s military commitments overseas changed radically after 1945. No longer would there be the 
dispatch of hundreds of thousands of Australians to follow those of the First and Second AIF of the two world wars, 
and their compatriots in the RAN and RAAF. A huge, but often underestimated, change in Australia’s way of making 
war took place in 1948, when for the first time we established a standing army, instead of relying on the recruitment 
of volunteers who would serve ‘for the duration’. The ‘teeth arm’ (in the jarring military phrase) of the standing 
army—the infantry—was designated the Royal Australian Regiment, created by designating the three battalions  
which served in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan as the regiment’s First, Second and Third 
Battalions (1RAR, 2RAR and 3RAR).
From the Korean War onwards, our contribution to overseas conflicts would no longer be ‘all in’, as in the two world 
wars, but would be carefully graduated according to the political climate, both in Australia and internationally. 
Australia’s initial responses to requests for support generally included less politically sensitive elements, such as 
transport aircraft from the RAAF or RAN vessels to be used to intercept supplies to insurgents. After that, RAAF or 
RAN combat units, or both, might be deployed, or Army units that were, in theory at least, less likely to be involved 
in direct combat, such as advisory teams or engineers. The crucial and potentially controversial final step, both 
politically and militarily, was the decision to commit one or more battalions of the RAR, often associated with small 
but highly trained and effective elements of the Special Air Service (SAS).
Finally, in the undeclared wars of the post-1945 era, Australian forces wouldn’t take part in an invasion, but would 
only operate in another country with the explicit consent, and preferably at the invitation, of the local government: 
hence the importance attached to the famous ‘request’ from Saigon for the commitment in Vietnam. We wouldn’t 
make commitments in order to effect ‘regime change’ where communists or their allies had gained power, but those 
we did make were designed to support the established order and to prevent communists from making further gains. 
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Even at the height of the Vietnam War, Canberra, like Washington, rejected any notion of invading North Vietnam 
and removing the regime in Hanoi. The war was intended to defend the regime in the south, not to overturn its rival 
in the north.
A strategy for the times, until times changed
Taken together, these elements established a strategy that was a reasonable response to the geopolitical 
circumstances. It focused Australian attention on one region of the world, Southeast Asia, where the combination of 
the decolonisation of the European empires and the Cold War was creating a volatile political cauldron, disturbingly 
close to Australia’s shores. The Australian Government determined that the national interest would best be served 
by opposing communist or pro-communist movements, while assisting anticommunist nationalists to establish and 
maintain control. Towards that end, the forward defence strategy balanced alliance and regional relationships by 
stating that Australia’s military commitments would be only in Southeast Asia, and only alongside our great power 
allies. It also balanced commitments and resources. The insistence on fighting only alongside the US, Britain, or 
both, and the caution with which commitments were made, kept defence expenditure down. After the heavy costs 
of the Korean War, the government placed an absolute ceiling on defence expenditure, about £200 million per year, 
which represented a declining proportion of GDP as the economy grew in the postwar boom. The government 
was able to allocate resources towards ‘national development’ rather than defence, notwithstanding occasional 
complaints from London and Washington that Australia wasn’t carrying its share of the defence burden.
In 1959, cabinet’s principal defence advisers, both civilian and uniformed, urged the government to give the armed 
forces a greater capacity ‘to act independently of Allies’. Cabinet firmly rejected this advice, stating that Australia’s 
‘limited population and resources’ couldn’t sustain ‘self-supporting Forces’. It evidently feared that a greater 
measure of self-reliance in defence would be inordinately costly, and that the public might see it as displaying a lack 
of faith in our allies. Instead, we would continue to rely on supporting our allies in collective arrangements such as 
SEATO and ANZUS. The Australian Government would continue to ‘talk a good war’, loudly proclaiming its support 
for British and American policies in Southeast Asia, while insisting that it didn’t have the resources to make large 
commitments, and carefully limiting the military and political costs of the commitments it did make.
Both the positive and the negative results of military commitments in this period arose not so much from the 
overall strategy but from the statecraft with which it was applied. The following chapters examine the three 
military commitments that Australia made under the rubric of forward defence. They pay particular attention to 
three elements:
• Australia’s handling of its relations with the principal ally or allies involved, especially in shaping the size and 
duration of the commitment and the definition of the role and operational methods of the Australian forces 
committed
• the balance between military action and diplomacy, especially in regional capitals
• the relationship between the government’s external policies and domestic party politics.
Both the positive and the negative results of military commitments 
in this period arose not so much from the overall strategy but from 
the statecraft with which it was applied. 
CHAPTER 2
The Malayan Emergency
In 1948, the British colonial authorities declared a state of emergency to combat a communist-led insurgency in 
their territories on and around the Malayan peninsula, giving the name ‘Malayan Emergency’ to what became a 
12-year conflict. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) government led by Ben Chifley gave them no military assistance. 
Although generally sympathetic to Britain’s Labour government, Chifley was reluctant to support Britain’s return 
to Malaya, seeing the insurgency as primarily a legitimate rebellion by exploited workers. He and his principal 
advisers saw the Malayan rebellion as akin to the revolution in Indonesia, where Australian diplomacy had played an 
important role in helping the nationalists to gain independence from the Dutch.
The Liberal–Country Party coalition government led by Robert Menzies, elected in December 1949, was widely 
expected to take a different view, given Menzies’ outspokenly pro-British and anticommunist views. Certainly, he 
soon faced pressure, both from London and from media commentators in Australia, to give significant support to 
the British authorities, on the grounds that Malaya was a major battleground in the Cold War between democracy 
and communism. The striking aspect of Menzies’ response to this pressure, in the first year of his long postwar prime 
ministership, was its caution. He and his cabinet colleagues went to considerable lengths to demonstrate that, 
while they were determined to fight international communism, they had no wish to prejudice their relationship with 
genuine (that is, non-communist) nationalists in Southeast Asia; and they didn’t necessarily accept British political 
and military assessments.
The Menzies government invited senior British officials to visit Australia, where they made their case to opposition 
as well as government politicians and to the wider community. Menzies also dispatched a substantial and 
well-qualified military mission to Malaya, including several rising stars of the three armed services. Their task was 
to make an independent assessment of all aspects of the British campaign against the insurgents. They were also 
expected to give advice to the British authorities, based on the widespread assumption that our military had gained 
considerable expertise in jungle warfare during the New Guinea campaigns from 1942 to 1945. In discussions in 
Malaya, London and Australia, Australian political and military leaders questioned British tactics, especially the 
use of bombers and conventional infantry forces. They expressed severe doubts about the value and relevance of 
bombing in a counterinsurgency campaign in Southeast Asian jungles. Some Australian politicians favoured what 
one called ‘the dirt boys stuff’—the unorthodox techniques used by what are today known as special forces, such as 
the Special Operations Executive, during the world war.
The upshot of extensive discussions and debate was that Australia dispatched an RAAF squadron of Dakota 
transport aircraft, whose contribution was valuable but neither glamorous nor highly sensitive in domestic or 
international politics. Another RAAF squadron of Lincoln bombers was also sent, but only after persistent pressure 
from the British and extensive questioning by the Australians. The commitment was prompted by the unexpected 
outbreak of the Korean War. This, the government decided, was another theatre in the global Cold War, and it could 
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best show its support for the Western cause by committing the bombers to serve in Malaya. Fighting alongside its 
traditional Commonwealth allies once again offered opportunities for command experience: for two years, an RAAF 
officer commanded all RAF and RAAF units operating in Malaya.
Notwithstanding his strong pro-British and anticommunist views, Menzies showed no inclination to send infantry 
battalions to Malaya in 1950, even before any such commitment was rendered impossible by the requirement 
to send two battalions to Korea. By the time Australian troops were sent to Malaya in 1955—the first Australian 
troops to be sent overseas in peacetime—the circumstances had greatly changed. The tide of the campaign had 
reversed: after their early successes, the communist insurgents were now a small and declining force. The British 
had introduced a number of tactical innovations, which were so successful that they would come to be regarded 
as a template for the conduct of counterinsurgency. In the late 1950s, Australian troops were involved in what their 
official historian has described as ‘a long, frustrating and occasionally bloody clean-up operation’ (Peter Dennis in 
Grey and Dennis 1996). The Australians operated closely with British and other Commonwealth forces, using tactics 
in which they had full confidence and which exposed them to a low rate of battle casualties.
The international context was also largely consistent with Australian preferences. The troops were committed as 
part of the Australian contribution to the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve. Unlike the Americans, 
the British wished to have a ‘force-in-being’ located in the region. The Australian Government was happy to 
contribute elements from all three services to the Strategic Reserve. This was entirely consistent with the policy 
of using small Australian commitments to encourage Britain to remain committed, within the multinational 
Commonwealth context, to the military defence of Southeast Asia. It was happy to have the troops involved in 
counterterrorist operations, but didn’t want them to be drawn into dealing with communal tensions in Malaya or 
left-wing riots in Singapore.
Malaya was moving towards independence, and the emerging Malay leadership welcomed the presence of the 
Commonwealth troops and their contribution to the campaign against the ‘communist terrorists’, as the insurgents 
were termed. They did not, however, want the Australian troops to be linked to the broader anticommunist goals 
of SEATO. Any suggestion of association with SEATO was even more sensitive in Singapore, which was moving 
separately towards independence and where left-wing forces were powerful. Intense diplomacy was required 
before the Australian Government could arrive at a formula that satisfied it, the British authorities (in London and 
in the region), and the local Malayan and Singaporean leaders. The ‘primary role’ of the Australian troops, it was 
announced, was to deter communist aggression in Southeast Asia as part of the Strategic Reserve; their ‘secondary 
role’ was to take part in counterterrorist operations in Malaya. The troops were deployed in ways that made it clear 
that they wouldn’t take part in suppressing left-wing riots in Singapore or communal violence in Malaya.
The Malayan Emergency proved to be an important test of Australian statecraft in the post-1945 era. Australian 
political, diplomatic and military leaders worked hard to secure their strategic goals, engaging effectively with both 
their principal ally and the local nationalists. When Malaya gained its independence in 1957, the new government, 
elected with clear popular support, invited the Australians and other Commonwealth forces to stay and to continue 
their anti-terrorist operations. They were also asked to remain in the region after the emergency was finally declared 
over in 1960.
The Malayan Emergency proved to be an important test of Australian 
statecraft in the post-1945 era.
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The experience of the Malayan Emergency had a lasting effect on Australian political and military leaders. The 
Army grew confident that Australian soldiers, especially the RAR and SAS, had become skilled in counterinsurgency 
operations in Southeast Asia, especially when working with British and Commonwealth allies. Political leaders, not 
least Menzies, drew the lesson that Western powers could intervene successfully in a former colony, at the request of 
the postcolonial leadership, to ensure that the new nation would be pro-Western and anticommunist.
The dispatch of Australian troops to Malaya in 1955, although limited and constrained in many ways, aroused 
considerable controversy within Australia. It happened to coincide with a deep and damaging split in the ALP, 
in which a substantial section of the party broke off to form what became the Democratic Labor Party (DLP). 
Opposition to communism, in Southeast Asia as well as in Australia, was fundamental to the DLP’s stance; thus, the 
question of ‘troops to Malaya’ acquired great symbolic significance in the ALP–DLP split. From 1955 to 1972, the 
DLP’s electoral preferences were enormously important in keeping the Liberal–Country Party coalition in office 
and the ALP on the opposition benches. But splitting the ALP party was a bonus for the government, not a principal 
purpose of the commitment. The government worked hard to develop and implement a nuanced policy, skilfully 
applying the principles of forward defence: good policy proved to be electorally advantageous politics.
CHAPTER 3
The Indonesian Confrontation
After the end of the Malayan Emergency, Australia’s political and military leaders’ confidence in forward defence was 
soon tested, as new challenges arose in the early 1960s. What most concerned Canberra was the division between 
the Southeast Asian policies of its two great allies towards two developing crises in Southeast Asia. Since 1954, 
the US had assumed the role of protector of the Republic of Vietnam, commonly known as South Vietnam, under 
President Ngo Dinh Diem. Initially, Diem had seemed able and effective, but his corrupt and narrowly based regime 
was increasingly challenged by militant Buddhists and a growing communist insurgency, initiated and supported by 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam. Hanoi and Washington were already fighting a proxy war in 
Laos, but a Geneva agreement of 1962, which supposedly neutralised Laos, brought only a temporary respite in the 
pressure. The US sought the support of its allies in Indochina. Under Menzies’ leadership, the Australian Government 
was more than willing to respond but, to Australia’s dismay, Britain clearly had no appetite to engage in what was, in 
effect, the start of the Vietnam War (more appropriately known as the Second Indochina War).
London’s focus was further south, and most especially on the ‘Confrontation’ that President Sukarno of Indonesia 
had declared towards the proposal to join Malaya, Singapore and two former British colonies on the island of 
Borneo, Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak, into the new federation of Malaysia. The British portrayed Sukarno 
as a latter-day Hitler, with expansionist ambitions across the region, and pressed Australia and New Zealand for 
assistance. The US took a markedly different approach. Washington urged the Commonwealth countries to resist 
Confrontation with minimal force, in order to avoid unduly antagonising Sukarno and pushing him further into the 
hands of the Indonesian Communist Party (then the world’s third largest communist party) and its allies in China 
and the Soviet Union. Most Australians were far more concerned about Indonesia than about events in Indochina, 
but when Australia’s leaders asked anxiously whether they could expect support from the US if Confrontation 
escalated, the Americans gave distinctly cautious answers. They indicated that much would depend on the restraint 
with which the Commonwealth countries opposed Confrontation, and the level of support that Australia gave to the 
Americans in Indochina.
In short, Australia was being pulled in sharply different directions by its two great allies over two separate Southeast 
Asian crises, with each ally seeking support in one conflict while counselling against involvement in the other. The 
Australian Government was facing the greatest test of both its strategy and its statecraft since 1945.
Menzies clearly sympathised with the ‘mother country’ and its characterisation of Sukarno as a new Hitler or 
Mussolini, but his government’s response to the developing crisis was notably cautious. Despite pressure from 
London, Menzies was reluctant to give unequivocal support to Malaysia against Indonesia. When he finally 
announced Australia’s support for Malaysia, his statement read more like a highly qualified legal document than a 
robust political affirmation. Part of his caution may well have been a response to Washington’s advice, but much of 
it came from another source.
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The outstanding feature of Australia’s handling of Confrontation was the role of the Minister for External Affairs 
(as Foreign Affairs was then known), Sir Garfield Barwick, and the diplomats of his department. The diplomats 
convinced Barwick, and he in turn convinced the cabinet more often than not, to adopt a nuanced and subtle 
approach. Australian policies were designed to dissuade Indonesia from ‘confronting’ Malaysia, and to give sufficient 
support to Britain to ensure that it remained engaged in the region and didn’t withdraw its forces from ‘east of 
Suez’—a prospect already being foreshadowed—but to act with great restraint. The upshot was a combination of 
military and diplomatic activity in a display of statecraft that one diplomat has, with justifiable pride, characterised 
as international best practice (Woodard 1998).
Australian reactions to requests from London for military support were highly cautious. Barwick, who had gained a 
reputation as one of the most forthright barristers at the robust Sydney bar, told the British that they should adopt 
a ‘graduated response’ to Indonesian aggression, taking military measures that were carefully calibrated, with the 
aim of allowing Malaysia to come into existence as planned, but without antagonising the Indonesians more than 
was absolutely unavoidable. His attitude clearly frustrated the British political and military leaders, as well as some 
in Australia, but the Australian cabinet generally followed this path. Pressure from London for military support 
from Australia began in late 1963, but the Australians agreed to send a squadron of Army engineers (to be engaged 
principally in building roads) only in April 1964. The crucial decision to send an RAR battalion was taken only in 
January 1965, after more than a year of pressure from London and Kuala Lumpur.
The caution in these commitments was based partly on assessments by Australian military and political intelligence 
to the effect that British and Malaysian military actions were sufficient to prevent the Indonesian campaign from 
succeeding. Australian authorities were generally well informed, from their own military and diplomatic sources, 
about developments in Indonesia and Malaysia. Australia didn’t want to provoke Indonesia into escalating its 
campaign, especially as that might provoke a threat to the Australian-administered territories in the eastern half 
of New Guinea. Even after the battalion was committed, and Australian and Indonesian soldiers were engaged 
in combat, with fatalities on both sides, Australia kept diplomatic relations open, maintained trade, aid and 
educational exchanges, and even permitted Australian and Indonesian officers to attend each other’s staff colleges.
Moreover, Barwick and the diplomats of External Affairs didn’t simply echo British policies, but engaged in vigorous 
diplomacy in the region. The heads of the Australian missions in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, Keith Shann and 
TK Critchley, were outstandingly effective, but credit should also be given to several senior External Affairs officials 
in Canberra, with whom Barwick worked closely. The British suspected that Australia’s decisions were unduly 
influenced by American attitudes, but the Australians insisted that their independent diplomacy was based on 
a clear assessment of our national interests, ‘refined but not defined’ (as the diplomats liked to say) by alliance 
considerations. The Indonesians clearly got the message that Australia was not merely echoing Britain. When the 
new federation of Malaysia was formally established in 1963, the British Embassy in Jakarta was sacked by rioters, 
but Australia’s was left unscathed.
While the Australian Government was determined to maintain some distance from British diplomacy, it maintained 
confidence in British military tactics. After eventually committing an infantry battalion and an SAS squadron in early 
1965, Australia maintained that commitment until Confrontation ended in late 1966. The government was happy 
to see our soldiers use the same small-unit operational methods as the British, Gurkha and Malaysian units that 
Australia didn’t want to provoke Indonesia into escalating its 
campaign, especially as that might provoke a threat to the 
Australian-administered territories in the eastern half of New Guinea.
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they fought alongside, and maintained close supervision of their secret cross-border operations. The RAR and SAS 
troops, for their part, showed considerable skill in operating effectively but discreetly, inflicting casualties on the 
Indonesians without causing them humiliating loss of ‘face’.
When Confrontation ended in 1966, Australian authorities were able to look back with pride on a successful exercise 
in statecraft, handled with subtlety and skill at the political, diplomatic and military levels. The coordinated and 
nuanced policy hadn’t been achieved without difficulty. There were repeated episodes of tension between the 
Prime Minister and the Minister for External Affairs, and between their departments. Officials in the Prime Minister’s 
Department accused External Affairs of being ‘soft’ on Indonesia, while the diplomats sometimes lectured their 
colleagues on the importance of ensuring a good long-term relationship with Jakarta. In short, the policy wasn’t 
dictated unilaterally by the Prime Minister but emerged from robust discussions involving ministers and officials of 
several departments.
The politics of the Confrontation commitment outside the ministerial and bureaucratic milieu were also robust. 
Barwick faced criticism from a number in his own party, who thought he was too ‘soft’ on Indonesia. In the early 
1960s, an unusual alliance was formed between the leader of the ALP opposition, Arthur Calwell, and the Sydney 
Morning Herald, which had usually supported the conservative Coalition. Criticism of the government’s supposed 
‘appeasement’ of Indonesia was one expression of this strange alliance. By contrast, Calwell’s deputy, Gough 
Whitlam, understood and supported the government’s approach. Policy towards Indonesia thus contributed to 
the endemic tensions between the left and right wings of the ALP, and between its ageing leader and his young and 
ambitious deputy, strengthening the government’s political position. But, once again, policy came before politics. 
The government worked hard to develop and implement a nuanced and independent policy; the political benefits it 
derived were a well-earned bonus.
CHAPTER 4
The Vietnam War
The handling of the commitment to Vietnam was in sharp contrast with that to Confrontation, despite the fact that 
many of the crucial decisions on the two conflicts were taken by largely the same people, over the same period 
(from late 1963 to mid-1965), and often at the same meetings of the principal ministerial and official committees.
Much of the difference came down to the role of Prime Minister Menzies. The caution that he displayed in 
decision-making on the Malayan Emergency and Confrontation was set aside when he addressed Vietnam. The 
evidence suggests that he believed that it was essential, in Australia’s national interests, to ensure that the US 
remained committed to the security of Southeast Asia. The danger, as Menzies and many of his generation saw it, 
was not American imperialism, overreach or hubristic exaggeration of the capacity of American power: the real 
danger was American isolationism. It seemed impossible to believe that the US military—the most powerful the 
world had ever seen—could be defeated, provided its government was fully committed. It was understandable that 
Menzies, who had been a young man of military age during the First World War and Prime Minister from 1939 to 1941, 
should fear another experience of being engaged in a war without American support; but, in the circumstances of 
Southeast Asia in the 1960s, that was a flawed perspective. The strategic situation was such that even the mightiest 
superpower would struggle, and eventually fail, to preserve a non-communist regime in South Vietnam.
Menzies’ views on Indochina were significantly shaped during the two years, 1960 and 1961, when he was Minister 
for External Affairs as well as Prime Minister. During that time, successive crises in Laos—in effect, early rounds of 
the Vietnam War—came to a head. The nature of global politics combined with Menzies’ own predilections to ensure 
that he saw these crises primarily in terms of their impact on the Cold War relationships of the great powers. Britain 
and France were clearly determined to stay out of Indochina, making Menzies all the more determined to keep the 
US engaged. Under his leadership, the cabinet decided on three occasions between 1959 and 1961 that Australia 
would be prepared to fight alongside the US in Indochina. Menzies and his colleagues explicitly accepted that this 
could mean sacrificing several of their forward defence principles: Australia would fight alongside the US, even if 
that meant fighting without Britain or any of the other SEATO powers, and even at the risk of precipitating a nuclear 
conflict with China.
In the early 1960s, after more than a decade as Prime Minister, Menzies dominated decision-making on Indochina. 
Neither the Minister nor the officials of External Affairs would be allowed the influence they had exerted on 
policy towards Indonesia. Paul Hasluck, who replaced Barwick in April 1964, brought a formidable intellect and 
considerable experience to the position, but his relations with departmental officials were frosty. They thought that 
he was too deferential to Menzies; he thought that they were overconfident of their own abilities. Hasluck rebuked 
diplomats who seemed insufficiently supportive of the government’s assessments of Vietnam.
In the crucial months of late 1964 and early 1965, Menzies shaped the policymaking process on Vietnam, excluding 
or minimising the influence of ministers and officials who expressed dissent or recommended caution. The 
diplomats were set aside, and the head of External Affairs, the formidable Arthur Tange, was a lame duck, his 
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departure having been signalled almost a year before it took effect. Instead, Menzies relied heavily on the two most 
senior military officers. The Air Force’s flamboyant Frederick Scherger and Army’s dour John Wilton had markedly 
different personalities, but both supported the Vietnam commitment. Wilton remained dedicated to SEATO and 
to a SEATO-aligned commitment to the war. Scherger had regretted American reluctance to intervene in 1954 in 
order to prevent the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu; he now wholeheartedly supported American and Australian 
involvement, confidently assuming that an American defeat was impossible. Menzies sent Scherger, but no-one 
from External Affairs, to a crucial meeting in Honolulu. There, Scherger blatantly disregarded his prudent and 
cautious official brief, which urged him to be noncommittal and to ask probing questions about American strategy. 
Instead, he pressed an Australian battalion onto the Americans, although the Americans had no clear strategy 
and had asked Australia only to increase its team of army advisers. Scherger was known to be close to Menzies, 
and the New Zealanders who witnessed his actions were probably right to conclude that he was acting at Menzies’ 
personal direction.
By working closely with Scherger and Wilton while excluding other advisers, Menzies was able to drive decisions with 
minimal intervention or influence by other ministers and departments or the established ministerial and official 
committees, which had been working effectively. After he won his seventh successive federal election in 1963, his 
position in cabinet, in the party-room and in parliament was unassailable.
The exclusion of wider advice on Vietnam was particularly unfortunate, as Australians knew much less about 
events and political dynamics in mainland Southeast Asia than about developments in the islands and peninsulas 
to Australia’s immediate north. We had a diplomatic mission in Saigon, but none in Hanoi or Beijing. We therefore 
had neither the opportunity to form independent assessments of North Vietnamese and Chinese policies or of the 
crucial relationship between the two communist regimes, nor the capacity to conduct the sort of independent 
diplomacy that was so effective in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur during Confrontation.
No less important was our limited knowledge of policymaking within the government of our major ally. Australian 
ministers and diplomats didn’t challenge official American analyses and policies over developments in Vietnam, as 
they’d challenged the British over both the Malayan Emergency and Confrontation. The Australian Government’s 
sole aim was to urge the Americans to stay in Vietnam and maintain the fight. Public statements and private 
assurances from the White House and the State Department were accepted at face value, with limited insights 
into the bureaucratic battles between hawks and doves in the interagency process. In this respect, Australian 
policymakers were no worse off than many American officials and commentators, but they were unwise to rely on 
official American statements on critical episodes, such as the 1963 assassination of President Diem and the 1964 
Gulf of Tonkin incident.
Menzies didn’t disguise his personal commitment. He told his key ministers that he was ‘looking for a way in, and 
not a way out’. The outcome of his personal domination of the policy process was that Australian combat forces 
were committed to Vietnam with no exit strategy, no explicit or implied limit on the size or the duration of the 
commitment, and inadequate attention to ensuring that the forces could use their preferred operational methods. 
The RAR battalions in the Australian task force were too often required to adopt what Wilton called the Americans’ 
‘meatgrinder’ tactics, relying on technology and heavy firepower and accepting heavy casualties, rather than 
the jungle-fighting tactics the Australians had practised in Malaya and Borneo. This led to tensions between the 
American and Australian military leaders in Vietnam. The fault wasn’t solely on the American side: some Australian 
Australian ministers and diplomats didn’t challenge official 
American analyses and policies over developments in Vietnam, as 
they’d challenged the British over both the Malayan Emergency 
and Confrontation. 
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leaders probably underestimated the nature and dimensions of the communist challenge in 1965, by which time 
it was too late to rely solely on the counterinsurgency tactics used in Malaya and the Confrontation. But the result 
was that the Australians were thrust into major battles and exposed to casualty rates that the Americans considered 
unexceptionable, but which caused rising dismay to Australian political leaders, the Australian public and the 
soldiers themselves.
The command and control arrangements were also uncongenial. In the Malayan Emergency and the Indonesian 
Confrontation, Australian and allied forces had operated within a system that carefully coordinated the civilian, 
military and police agencies of all the national forces involved, with clear lines of command and responsibility. The 
Free World forces in Vietnam, by contrast, comprised a loosely coordinated coalition, within which major tensions 
and rivalries were generated between countries, services, agencies and individuals. The lines of command and 
control, even for a relatively small contingent such as the Australian Force Vietnam, resembled a child’s plate 
of spaghetti.
These and other factors contributed to the growing unpopularity of a commitment that had started with substantial 
public support. The main arguments behind the commitment were the domino theory and the insurance policy. The 
widespread volatility in Southeast Asia gave the domino theory some validity when the crucial decisions were made 
from 1963 to 1965, but by 1968 and 1969 much had changed. Malaysia and Singapore were more stable after their 
split in 1965 than before; Thailand was less vulnerable to communist pressure, having suppressed an insurgency 
near the Laos border; most importantly, Indonesia was on a totally different path after the events of late 1965; and 
the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) indicated some desire by the non-communist 
nations of the region to cooperate.
Some form of Australian commitment to support our American ally was understandable, and probably inevitable, in 
1965. It was both an exercise in burden-sharing and advisable in our own interests, given the possible escalation of 
Confrontation and a potential threat to our responsibilities in New Guinea. But the way Menzies and his successor, 
Harold Holt, handled the commitment in its early years made it extremely difficult to withdraw after about 1968, as 
public opinion turned against the war. John Gorton, Prime Minister from 1968 to 1971, clearly felt trapped by the 
decisions of his predecessors. If Menzies and Holt had handled the commitment with greater skill and dexterity—
that is, with superior statecraft—it might have been possible for Australia to withdraw, or to significantly reduce its 
exposure to casualties abroad and tensions at home, before the ‘moratorium’ marches and other protests of the 
early 1970s.
The deficiencies in statecraft had a long-term impact on domestic party politics. Menzies evidently believed that the 
commitment would not only have broad popular support but would once again drive a wedge between the right and 
left wings of the ALP. Events in previous years encouraged such hopes, but by the time the first combat battalion was 
committed, Labor was alive to the dangers. Calwell gave what’s now regarded as one of Australia’s greatest political 
speeches, which held the party together on a policy of opposition to the war. Holt won a massive victory at the 1966 
election, fought on the issues of Vietnam and conscription, but as the war dragged on, with rising cost in blood 
and treasure, public opinion turned towards Labor. A highly selective system of national service, which sent more 
than 15,000 conscripts to Vietnam, where 200 of them died, greatly exacerbated the unpopularity of the war, even 
though the scheme had been introduced with Confrontation in mind as much as Vietnam. Most of the Australian 
troops were withdrawn by William McMahon in 1971, but by that time Gough Whitlam’s reputation for superior 
understanding of international affairs would help him to win the 1972 election and to form the first ALP federal 
government in 23 years.
In short, the problem wasn’t simply that the government applied the principles of forward defence to the Vietnam 
commitment, as it had done previously to the Emergency and Confrontation. The problem lay less in the broad 
strategy than in the statecraft with which it was applied. More skilful policymaking in 1964 and 1965 could have led 
to a more carefully calibrated policy, which would have secured the geopolitical benefit of ‘holding the line’ against 
communist influence and the diplomatic benefit of supporting the American alliance, while reducing Australia’s 
exposure to the long-term political, diplomatic and social costs of the Vietnam War.
CHAPTER 5
Some lessons for today
Since the 1960s, library shelves have groaned under the weight of books on ‘the lessons of Vietnam’. Most have 
been written by and for Americans, who were puzzled and frustrated by what many in the US regarded as their first 
defeat. Like many other aspects of the commitment, the lessons of Vietnam for Australia are similar and related, but 
not identical, to America’s. The preceding chapters suggest that Australians should seek to learn the lessons not of 
the Vietnam War but of the Vietnam era—in other words, the period when Australia was militarily engaged not only 
in the Vietnam War but also in the Malayan Emergency and the Indonesian Confrontation. Our collective memory 
seems to have done the opposite of what individual memories generally do. We remember the pain and costs of the 
Vietnam War, and have allowed that memory to discredit anything that could be associated with it, while forgetting 
the strategic and other benefits gained, at much lower cost, by the commitments to the Malayan Emergency and 
the Confrontation.
Lesson 1: We need a coherent national security strategy
Lesson 1 is that Australia needs a national strategy that provides a framework for all our security policies, including 
those that use both hard and soft power assets. This isn’t the place to enter the subtle debate as to what constitutes 
strategy. We know, for example, that the Americans, at least in theory, prepare a National Security Strategy issued 
by the President; subordinate to this is a National Defense Strategy, issued by the Secretary of Defense; and 
subordinate to that is a National Military Strategy, issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Something similar, adapted to 
Australian constitutional arrangements, might be appropriate.
The major need, however, is not for detailed, formal documents. Some elements of a national strategy, such as 
doubts about the wisdom or capacity of one’s allies, must be kept to confidential discussions. More important is 
that Cabinet ministers and their most senior advisers have in mind a broad strategic concept, the major ‘organizing 
principles’ (to use Hillary Clinton’s phrase) of which are well understood by policymakers and, as far as possible, 
the public.
In Australia’s case, our national security strategy must strike an appropriate balance between commitments and 
resources, between alliances and regional relationships, and between military and non-military assets. It should 
provide a coherent framework within which Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and all 
the other relevant agencies can develop their own strategies. It should also underpin the public’s support for the 
commitments that the government decides to make, or not to make, in a particular crisis.
As a national strategy in the 1950s and 1960s, forward defence wasn’t perfect, but, provided its basic principles 
were understood, it responded reasonably well to the demands of the time. It provided a template that enabled the 
government of the day to decide how to respond to particular crises, including on such questions as whether, how, 
when and where to commit military forces, and when to rely on diplomacy and other non-military approaches. It 
gave direction to long-term policies, not just to crisis management.
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Lesson 2: Statecraft is as important as state power
To develop a national strategy is necessary, and difficult enough (as anyone involved can testify), but it isn’t 
sufficient. Lesson 2 is that the statecraft with which the strategy is applied is extremely important. As the old song 
says, it’s not (just) what you do, it’s the way that you do it.
As Australia’s experience in the Vietnam War showed, it’s crucially important not to assume that the basic principles 
of a strategy can be applied with a complacent assumption that what has worked in one case will necessarily work 
in another. Prudent decision-making must include constant and vigorous diplomacy, with allies and with other 
relevant parties, leading to independent political and military assessments. Any commitments that are made must 
be carefully defined, with express limits to their extent and duration.
In this respect, it’s instructive to compare Menzies’ commitment to Vietnam in 1965 with John Howard’s 
commitment to Iraq in 2003. Howard ensured that Australian forces were inserted quickly and removed quickly; 
they were given a specific responsibility, within their capacity and with the ability to employ their own tactics 
and operational methods; they operated under rules of engagement that, combined with military skill and a little 
luck, resulted in no battle casualties; and they were all volunteers, not conscripts. As a result, although the Iraq 
commitment was less clearly related to Australia’s interests, other than alliance management, than Vietnam and 
was less popular from the outset, Howard and his party didn’t pay the political price paid by Liberals in the 1970s 
and for long afterwards.
Lesson 3: Good policy can be good politics
Lesson 3 is that, in the long run, good policy is good politics, even if there may be a short-term cost. In both the 
Emergency and the Confrontation, the Menzies government developed sound policies that could be sustained in the 
long term, while sensitive to potential criticisms from both left and right. In each case, it was able to claim that the 
policy had been vindicated; and, in each case, its policies helped to widen the tensions between the right and left 
wings of the ALP. This success seems to have unduly influenced Menzies, who, by 1964–65, was in the last term of his 
record tenure of the prime ministership. He deprecated some of the centre-left critics of his Vietnam policies, who 
asserted that Australia was putting itself on the wrong side of Asian nationalism, by saying that they’d been proved 
wrong when they’d made similar claims about Malaya in the 1950s. He failed to recognise that the critics were on 
firmer ground on Vietnam than they had been on Malaya.
Menzies also appeared confident that the Vietnam commitment would receive broad popular support and drive 
another wedge between the wings of the ALP. He didn’t see that the party had a stronger case in 1965 than it had 
in the early 1950s, and that it had learned valuable lessons about how to handle its position on the commitment, 
as was shown in the preparation of Calwell’s speech. For a time, the confidence of Menzies and his successor, Holt, 
seemed justified: Holt won an unprecedentedly strong electoral victory in the 1966 election. But from the beginning 
of 1968, John Gorton was clearly frustrated by his inability to pull out of Vietnam, and in the longer term the war was 
an albatross around the Liberal Party’s neck. In the 1980s, the party’s federal president lamented that Vietnam had 
cost the Liberals the support of a generation.
Lesson 4: Never ignore diplomacy
A corollary of this is Lesson 4, which relates to the idea, much discussed in recent times, that all Australian 
commitments of forces overseas should be subject to parliamentary decision. While this has obvious attractions 
to democrats of most types, experience suggests some drawbacks. This pressure comes largely from critics of 
Australia’s commitments to Vietnam and to Iraq (in 2003 and 2014), and seems to assume that parliament would act 
as a brake on an over-eager executive. That assumption isn’t necessarily valid. During Confrontation, for example, 
many on both sides of politics expressed vehement criticisms of Indonesia and of the Australian Government for 
its alleged ‘appeasement’ of Sukarno. As this paper argues, skilful statecraft sometimes involved complex and 
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discreet military and diplomatic manoeuvres. An open parliamentary debate would doubtless have led to blunt 
denunciations of Sukarno’s real or assumed intentions, making it extraordinarily difficult for the government 
to maintain diplomatic, trade, aid and other relationships, even while Australian and Indonesian soldiers were 
inflicting casualties on each other. Parliamentary debate would inevitably focus heavily on the military aspects of 
any commitment, obscuring and making more difficult the concurrent diplomatic and political elements, which are 
equally, if not more, important to success.
A further corollary is the desirability of governments not withdrawing ambassadors at times of tension. It’s precisely 
at such times that governments most need able ambassadors in place, using their contacts, skills and experience 
to minimise and contain the tensions and to seek fruitful ways forward. Australia’s policies over Confrontation were 
developed in Canberra, but they owed much of their success to Shann’s advice on Indonesian policies and politics 
and to his ability to convey Australia’s views to Sukarno and the other Indonesian leaders.
Lesson 5: Listen to critics, whoever they are
Lesson 5 is that good policy doesn’t come easily. While decisions about war or peace are always ultimately 
decisions for the Prime Minister, the commitments of the Vietnam era demonstrate the importance of robust policy 
discussion, involving a wide range of ministers and departmental officials, in which Prime Ministers and their closest 
advisers are willing to listen to critics both inside and outside the policy process. Menzies’ greatest successes 
in foreign relations came when he gave a degree of freedom to capable ministers, as he did to Barwick over 
Confrontation (and earlier to Percy Spender over the negotiation of ANZUS and to John McEwen over the commerce 
treaty with Japan). Conversely, he was least successful when he deliberately sidelined or overruled key ministers, as 
he did with Richard Casey over the Suez crisis and other ministers over Vietnam.
As this is written, Julie Bishop is being widely acclaimed as one of the outstanding performers in the Abbott 
government. Historical experience suggests that Abbott would be wise to give Bishop a good deal of freedom of 
manoeuvre, based on a clear understanding of their respective roles and on extensive discussions in the National 
Security Committee of Cabinet. The temptations for a prime minister to seek a dominant role in foreign affairs and 
matters of national security are extremely strong, but a wise one gives priority to domestic matters, especially in a 
government’s first term.
Lesson 6: Understand our allies and engage in our region
Lesson 6 is that national security policy works most effectively when the government is able to deploy not only 
a well-trained and well-equipped defence force, but also a skilled, competent and confident foreign service, and 
when there’s mutual confidence between ministers and officials. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that 
Australia’s greatest need in national security policy is a considerable boost to the fortunes of DFAT. (Robert Gates, 
as US Secretary of Defense, similarly prioritised the State Department’s resources over the Pentagon’s.) Much of 
the commentary has focused on the size and resources of the foreign service and the number of missions to which 
diplomats are sent. At the time of the last election, there was a widespread expectation that an incoming Coalition 
government would boost DFAT’s resources, probably by reducing the budget for AusAID. Instead, the Abbott 
government merged the two agencies. Whether that will prove the right answer remains an open question. As two 
agencies of similar size but decidedly different cultures, located in different parts of Canberra, are forced together, 
there’s certainly short-term pain: let’s hope for the long-term gain.
But the key issue isn’t a matter of numbers and resources, however important they may be. A vital element is 
confidence—self-confidence (short of hubristic arrogance) on the part of the diplomats and mutual confidence 
between officials and ministers. The government must show, by actions as well as words, that it regards DFAT as 
having a significant and respected role in formulating policy, and doesn’t regard its diplomats as mere functionaries 
whose role is to implement decisions taken in the Prime Minister’s Office, the Department of Prime Minister and 
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Cabinet, or other agencies. As the forward defence era showed, good statecraft requires vigorous, independent, 
well-resourced and well-informed diplomacy as much as a strong and effective defence force.
Australian diplomacy, which necessarily involves many departments along with DFAT, needs to give priority to 
two areas. One priority is obtaining and maintaining the best possible access to, and interaction with, the US and 
other allies. Our representatives must get behind the official assessments and declaratory policies to understand 
the dynamics that shape long-term policies. A major weakness in policymaking on Vietnam was that the Australian 
Government had too little information about what was happening in Washington’s interagency process. Taking at 
face value the statements from the White House or the State Department on, for example, the Gulf of Tonkin incident 
was not conducive to sound, long-term policymaking.
The other priority is to maintain the closest possible engagement with regional countries, especially Indonesia. 
Much attention has been given in recent years to the Australia–US–China triangle, with the corollary that we 
must devote great effort to understanding, and where possible influencing, the bilateral relationship between 
Washington and Beijing. No less important for Australian policymakers, although less commonly noticed, is the 
need to pay constant attention to the Australia–US–Indonesia triangle, including the bilateral relationship between 
Washington and Jakarta. Today, no less than in the 1960s, this triangle has a fundamental role in shaping Australia’s 
long-term relationships with the world.
Lesson 7: Demand and allow longer term perspectives
Lesson 7 is the importance of the government developing policies that are designed for the long term, beyond 
the three-year electoral cycle, and not just as reactions to crises, whether foreseen or unexpected. Politicians will 
inevitably be focused on surviving the next election, and departments are under immense pressure to comply 
with the pressures of the 24-hour media cycle and 140-character tweets. It should be part of the public service’s 
responsibility, especially in departments like Defence and Foreign Affairs, to encourage ministers to consider 
longer term developments. To a large degree, such thinking has been outsourced to think tanks. DFAT has taken an 
important step forward by re-establishing a policy planning section in DFAT. That section had some successes in the 
1960s, until it was disbanded by an unsympathetic minister. A revived policy planning area in DFAT should do useful 
work on long-term projections, working in consultation with think tanks such as ASPI, the Lowy Institute and the 
US Studies Centre; other agencies, including the Office of National Assessments, Defence, and the National Security 
Adviser; and comparable agencies in other governments, such as the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department. 
Defence might well consider establishing a similar unit.
Lesson 8: Know the past and learn from it
Finally, Lesson 8 is that the government should systematically aim to learn from the past to address the problems 
of the future. Some of Julie Bishop’s major speeches show that she’s been making good use of the department’s 
historical section, which was founded by an earlier Liberal foreign minister, Paul Hasluck, himself a distinguished 
historian. Kevin Andrews (or whoever succeeds him in the regrettably rapid turnover of Ministers for Defence) would 
do well to establish a comparable historical section in Defence to record and analyse major aspects of strategic and 
(to use one of Arthur Tange’s favourite phrases) ‘higher defence’ policy, which are outside the scope of the historical 
sections of the three services. (Defence Secretary Dennis Richardson, a history graduate whose academic mentor 
was the distinguished diplomatic historian Neville Meaney, might well be sympathetic.) As the DFAT comparison 
suggests, there are some things that can only be done by an in-house unit working separately from, but with some 
degree of collaboration with, academic historians such as those at the Australian National University, the Australian 
Defence Force Academy and a few institutions outside Canberra. Defence has already taken a valuable step in this 
direction by publishing a volume of the ‘Strategic basis’ papers (Fruehling 2009), but there’s scope for much more to 
be done.
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It is appropriate to end this paper on a note of cautious congratulations. For some time the government has been 
urged by veterans, historians and other commentators to commission official histories of Australia’s commitments 
in Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan. As was frequently noted in the commentary surrounding the centenary of the 
Gallipoli landing, Australia’s understanding of the nation’s involvement in the 1914–18 war has been shaped to a 
significant degree by the official history, for which CEW Bean was appointed official historian. Since then, Australian 
governments have appointed four further official war historians: Gavin Long for the 1939–45 war, Robert O’Neill 
for the Korean War, this writer for the three conflicts discussed in this paper, and David Horner, whose current 
remit covers an extensive range of peacekeeping and post-Cold War operations, but not those in Timor, Iraq 
or Afghanistan.
In the budget statement on 12 May, the government announced that money had been allocated for a six-volume 
official history of the Iraq and Afghanistan commitments and a single volume on the Timor commitment. This is 
greatly to be welcomed, provided these histories are to be written under the same conditions as their predecessors. 
Over the past century Australian governments of all political persuasions have granted the five official historians, 
and their respective teams of writers and researchers, unrestricted access to official records and freedom from any 
official or political censorship. The evidence suggests, I believe, that these official histories have served the nation 
well as a record of events and a basis for informed debate. 
In recent years, however, there have been regrettable signs that departments, under actual or anticipated 
pressure from ministers, have discouraged some histories, and have exercised excessive restraint in ‘clearing’ 
official or authorised histories, usually for fear of short-term political or diplomatic difficulties. This has affected 
even departments like DFAT and Defence, which have for decades had an outstanding record in encouraging 
well-researched and independently written histories of sensitive topics.
It is particularly important that the strategic dimensions of the Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan histories be fully covered 
in the new official histories. This area was pioneered in Australian official histories by Robert O’Neill’s volume on 
Australian strategy and diplomacy in the Korean War. This remains the best account of the origins of ANZUS (O’Neill 
1981). The official history for which I was appointed was originally to cover only the Malayan Emergency and the 
Vietnam War. It took some effort to have Confrontation included, but our understanding of the period and its lessons 
would have been greatly diminished if that had been omitted. Governments, at political and official levels, should 
have the confidence to tolerate brief media or diplomatic controversies in the interests of promoting well-informed 
historical debate, which can make a major contribution to good long-term policymaking. 
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Clinton, quoted in Goldberg (2014).
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Learning from history
Some strategic lessons from the ‘forward defence’ era
 Like many of our friends and allies, Australia is currently engaged in a major 
reassessment of its strategic policy. Those in and around the policymaking process 
are trying to define the nation’s core values and interests, to identify the most likely 
threats to those values and interests, and to frame a strategy that will best protect and 
promote our national security. This is happening at a time when many defence budgets 
are severely constrained. A period of postwar economic austerity would seem to be the 
worst time to prepare a long-term national security strategy.
In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, American diplomatic historian Melvyn Leffler 
turned this familiar dilemma on its head. Periods of postwar austerity and drastic 
cuts in military spending, according to him, have been good for American strategy, 
‘forcing Washington to think strategically, something it rarely does when times are 
flush’. Looking at the past hundred years of American strategy, Leffler argued that 
problems and errors arose less from tight budgets than from clinging too long to 
outdated strategic ideas and capabilities, under the influence of bureaucratic and 
domestic politics.
This paper takes a similar approach to Australian strategic thinking. The strategic 
calculations of a regional middle power are in some respects similar to those of a global 
superpower, but in others decidedly different from them. The fiscal circumstances are 
different, and not just because the Australian defence budget is a mere fraction of the 
American. Questions about the allocation of roles and resources between the military, 
diplomatic, intelligence and other agencies have some common themes. There’s much 
discussion about the nature and meaning of strategy, and where strategic planning’s 
to be found in the governmental structure. Does the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade ‘do strategy’, or is strategy the exclusive territory of the Department of Defence? 
Moreover, some of Australia’s problems may have come not only from clinging too long 
to outdated ideas, but also from discarding some that are still relevant—perhaps we’ve 
thrown out some strategic babies with the bathwater.
